Showing posts with label New Jersey Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Jersey Supreme Court. Show all posts

Thursday, September 1, 2016

The NJ Supreme Court and the Evisceration of the Debt Limitation Clause


Is there any subject in school which American kids are lied to as much as civics?

The "Three Ring Circus":
Real Government Ain't Schoolhouse Rock
Back in many iterations of civics I took in school, I was told that a myth that the legislative branch wrote the law, the executive branch implemented the law, and the judicial branch stepped in to settle disputes over what the law meant.

I remember my 4th grade teacher, Mrs. Eisenberg, telling us the legislature had the "power of the purse" and then jangling coins in front of the class.  With a vivid memory like that, it never occurred to me that judges might control taxes after all.

I was told a constitution could only be changed by an (often cumbersome) amendment process and that a court itself didn't have the power to amend a constitution.

Oh innocent me!

When it comes to lawmaking, few state Supreme courts can match the NJ Supreme Court, who has seized the "power of the purse" and whose judicial "independence" ought to be considered judicial supremacy.

Anyway, I thought I'd provide this handy guide to how the NJ Supreme Court has rewritten the NJ Constitution without the hassle of the legislature or voters having to get involved. (see here for the official text that the NJ Supreme Court cites in its lawmaking.)

The Education Clause 
(Article VIII, Section IV, Paragraph 1)

Original Text:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.

Note: The language "thorough and efficient system of schools" appears in several other states' constitutions, including Pennsylvania's, Minnesota's, Maryland's, and Illinois'. This language has not be interpreted in other states as extravagantly as it has been interpreted in New Jersey.

The "thorough and efficient" clause first appeared in NJ's third Constitution, which was approved in 1875.

From those three words "thorough and efficient" the NJ Supreme Court has constructed 21 Abbott decisions, hundreds of pages of legal verbiage, required school spending tens of billions in excess of what NJ's legislature would have given, and helped make NJ the country's third most indebted state.

The Education Clause has never been officially changed, but I think this is a fair reading of what it really means nowadays.

Abbottized Text:
1. The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools  [funded in excess of DFG I and J districts]
for the instruction of all the children in the State [districts that were classified as DFG A or B and Urban in the 1980s] between the ages of five three and eighteen years.

My term of art "districts classified as DFG A or B and Urban in the 1980s" means "Abbott districts."

There is a myth that the Abbott districts are NJ's poorest.  Instead, the Abbott list is the overlap of districts who were classified as DFG A or B in the 1980s with districts who were also "urban municipalities" according to a (politicized) Department of Community Affairs listing.  Scores of poor districts were excluded and a handful of non-poor districts, like Pemberton and Hoboken, were included.

I'm being tongue in cheek here about the NJ Supreme Court requiring that the Abbott list be permanently based on 1980s economic conditions.  It is the fault of NJ legislature and governors that the Abbott list has never been updated.

Although many people might contend that two years of Pre-K is educationally justified and worth the cost, it is a long constitutional stretch for the NJ Supreme Court to mandate Pre-K since the plain wording of the NJ Constitution says that the state is only obligated to provide a "thorough and efficient system of schools" for children age five to eighteen.

Anyway, the Supreme Court's changes to the Education Clause were additions.  The Supreme Court's changes to the Debt Limitation Clause is a deletion.

The Debt Limitation Clause 
(Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3a)

3. a. The Legislature shall not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt or debts, liability or liabilities of the State, which together with any previous debts or liabilities shall exceed at any time one per centum of the total amount appropriated by the general appropriation law for that fiscal year, unless the same shall be authorized by a law for some single object or work distinctly specified therein. Regardless of any limitation relating to taxation in this Constitution, such law shall provide the ways and means, exclusive of loans, to pay the interest of such debt or liability as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within thirty-five years from the time it is contracted; and the law shall not be repealed until such debt or liability and the interest thereon are fully paid and discharged.
Except as hereinafter provided, no such law shall take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people at a general election and approved by a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon. [my emphasis]

Note: The simple version of this is that NJ's voters must approve debt issuance greater than 1% of NJ's budget. Another way of putting it is "one ?Legislature may not incur debts [that] subsequent Legislatures would be obligated to pay, without prior approval by public referendum."

A version of this clause first appeared in the NJ Constitution of 1844, after the Panic of 1837, during which nine of NJ's "sister states" had defaulted. The idea behind the Debt Limitation Clause if that voters had to approve the debt and a method of paying the debt off, NJ would stay responsible and not overborrow.

Shorter Justice Alan Handler:
"An Abbott district's unwillingness to tax itself is
the same as its inability."
The Debt Limitation clause was respected strictly until after WWII, when it began to be eroded by debt for public authorities and one round of unapproved bonding for colleges, however, public authorities (like the Turnpike Authority) and colleges have their own revenue sources, so the repayment was not from tax dollars.

The most egregious violation of the Debt Limitation Clause has been through the bonding for (mostly Abbott) construction in the wake of 1997 and 1998's Abbott IV and Abbott V decisions, in which the NJ Supreme Court ordered 100% state funded construction for the Abbotts.

In the Abbott IV decision, Justice Alan B. Handler considered the truly bad facilities conditions of the Abbotts, but ignored their spectrum of tax base strength and tax stress, ignored non-Abbotts, ignored the massive operating aid the Abbotts were already receiving and then ordered state taxpayers to pay for every cent of Abbott construction, without a sliding scale of local responsibility.  
The State must, as part of its obligation under the education clause, provide facilities for children in the special needs districts that will be sufficient to enable those students to achieve the substantive standards that now define a thorough and efficient education. The quality of the facilities cannot depend on the district's willingness or ability to raise taxes or to incur debt.
Again, notice that Handler doesn't distinguish between willingness and ability to pay; from Handler's opinions, if an Abbott district is unwilling to pay, it is the same as if it were unable to pay.

Handlerism:
"Unwillingness=inability."

My problem with the NJ Supreme Court's argument is that the same deplorable conditions existed in non-Abbotts and not all Abbott schools were in this kind of terrible state.   The 100% state funding requirement is unfair to poor districts who are not Abbotts.  By not requiring the Abbotts to make any kind of copay, there is an incentive towards great waste, since the Abbotts are not spending their own money.

Over the two years after Abbott V came out the DOE did a more comprehensive survey of Abbott facilities, the cost of Abbott construction had grown to $6 billion, with another $2.6 billion thrown in for non-Abbotts to make legislative passage possible.  ($8.6 billion = $12 billion in 2016 dollars.)

Obeying the Supreme Court's dictate, in 2000 the Whitman Administration and legislature approved the "Education Facilities Construction Financing Act."  The $8.6 billion bond was NJ's largest single debt offering ever.

As the Star-Ledger reported:

The cost of rebuilding New Jersey's aging and overcrowded public schools could reach $11.5 billion - twice Gov. Christie Whitman's original projection - over the next seven years, state Treasurer Roland Machold estimated yesterday as lawmakers held their first public hearing on the plan. 
Machold said the program to rebuild hundreds of schools will cost taxpayers at least $500 million a year, but the Senate sponsor of the construction legislation, Sen. William Gormley (R-Atlantic), said he thinks the cost is likely to be even higher. He wants lawmakers to plan on spending up to $750 million a year on school construction. 
Either estimate would make school construction a dominant element in state budgets for years to come. It would amount to a 10 percent boost in state school aid, which already accounts for one-third of state spending. Even at $500 million per year, it would outstrip the state's annual spending on highway and mass transit construction, state colleges or welfare.

Lawmakers plan to issue billions of dollars in bonds to pay for the work, but there is no clear consensus on how to raise the $500 million to $750 million it will take to make the annual payments on those bonds.  [my emphasis]  (1)
NJ's state aid at the time was only $5 billion, so the Supreme Court had set in motion construction debt that would consume a tenth of NJ's aid distribution.

The bond issuance was highly controversial and many Republicans objected.

As the Star-Ledger reported:

"Abbott vs. Burke is wrongly decided from the beginning," [Assembly Speaker Jack] Collins said. "This just perpetuates that wrongness."
Collins argued that some of the so-called special-needs districts have prospered since the court case began three decades ago, and he says it is unfair to other needy communities to give the 30 districts special state funding treatment.
"This is illogical. It is wrong," Collins said at yesterday's hearing. "Ninety percent is a number that literally would make dollars available for other districts or for other state projects."  (2)
Collins reasonably said that the state should only pay for 90% of the costs of Abbott school construction, but then-Commissioner David Hespe objected, saying a 90% copay would cause the whole of Abbott to be re-litigated.

Despite the fact that the NJ Constitution says that the legislature cannot issue large debt "in any manner" without voter approval, the obsolescence of the Abbott list even in the 1990s, the legislature bowed to the NJ Supreme Court and approved the bond issuance.

The opposition then came from Mayor Steve Lonegan of Bogota, who was incensed by the debt issuance and organized a group "StopTheDebt" to challenge school construction bonding and (other debts issued) that was taking place without voter approval.

In the Lonegan I decision, Chief Justice Deborah Poritz declared for a 5-1 Supreme Court:

  1. School bonding debt was "sui generis" because the Education Clause, supported by the School Funding Clause, of the NJ Constitution superseded the Debt Limitation Clause.  
  2. The school construction bonding was labeled "contract debt" and bond buyers knew repayment was subject to the appropriations process.

    "Although there is doubtless a strong likelihood that payment of the bonds will in fact be met by legislative appropriations, we find nothing in the statute compelling the State to make such payments as a matter of law."

    I.e., the debt was not backed by the "full faith and credit" of New Jersey, i.e., the debt was not "General Obligation" bonds.  There is no "legal right to compel" repayment.

The legal argument the NJ Supreme Court's decision was rooted not on the NJ Constitution, but the NJ Supreme Court's own case law.

And not in some hoary old precedent that a consensus had crystalized around, but the Abbott V decision of 1998.

we uphold the Act because of reliance by the State on our prior case law, including Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998) (Abbott V), and for the separate and distinct reason that EFCFA was enacted by the Legislature in furtherance of the mandate found in Article VIII, Section IV, paragraph 1 (the Education Provision) of the New Jersey Constitution.

In other words, there's pure self-referential reasoning here.  The NJ Supreme Court decided the Debt Limitation Clause didn't apply because of what the NJ Supreme Court already decided in 1998.

The Supreme Court's Constitutional escape clause was that it was technically legal for NJ to default on school construction debt, and therefore it wasn't really debt.  

Lonegan claimed the "contract debt" concept was "subterfuge employed solely to avoid and contravene the Debt Limitation Clause of our Constitution" but the Supreme Court ignored that.

Post-Lonegan, this was the state of the Debt Limitation Clause:

3. a. The Legislature shall not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt or debts, liability or liabilities of the State, which together with any previous debts or liabilities shall exceed at any time one per centum of the total amount appropriated by the general appropriation law for that fiscal year, unless the same shall be authorized by a law for some single object or work distinctly specified therein. Regardless of any limitation relating to taxation in this Constitution, such law shall provide the ways and means, exclusive of loans, to pay the interest of such debt or liability as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within thirty-five years from the time it is contracted; and the law shall not be repealed until such debt or liability and the interest thereon are fully paid and discharged.
Except as hereinafter provided, no such law shall take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people at a general election and approved by a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon.
The most extraordinary deletion is "in any manner," since I would think "in any manner" means "no debt without voter approval," no matter what.

Post-Script

The NJ Supreme Court originally thought Abbott construction would cost $1.8 billion, but even the $6 billion for Abbott construction paid for by the 2000 bonds was inadequate due to systematic waste, exposed by the Inspector General.

The NJ Supreme Court thus ordered a second bond issuance in 2008 for $3.9 billion (of which $2.9 was earmarked for the Abbotts.)  ($3.9 bil = $4.3 bil in 2016 dollars)

As you can see, school construction debt is now nearly $1 billion a year.

Source, 2015 Debt Report
http://www.nj.gov/treasury/public_finance/pdf/DebtReportFY2015.pdf

And NJ is one of the US' most indebted states by any measure.


Of course all this bonding has created splendid facilities in Abbott districts:




And poor non-Abbotts were left behind.

East Newark's elementary school is from the 1890s and East Newark is a very poor DFG A town, but the state has ignored East Newark since East Newark is a non-Abbott.

East Newark's School is from the 1890s


The 2008 Constitutional Amendment on Debt Was a Joke


By 2008 NJ was one of the country's most indebted states. Of the state's $32 billion in debt, only $2.8 billion had been approved by the voters as the Constitution required. (The $32 bil doesn't count pension and retiree health care debt.)

In that year the legislature let the voters vote on a amendment that would superficially prohibit the future issuance of Contract Debt. The amendment was primarily authored by Leonard Lance, who promoted it as a way to rein in debt:

"Over the past couple of decades Trenton politicians have used a loophole to avoid the constitutional provision that all state borrowing must be approved by the voters. The Trenton politicians set up what amounts to dummy corporations (state authorities) to do the borrowing for them. Under this system total state debt has ballooned to nearly $40 million. This debt load is unsustainable."


Lance was right about the debt load being unsustainable, but it wasn't "Trenton politicians" who exclusively loaded up NJ on debt.  It was "Trenton Judges," like Alan Handler who forced this massive debt on the taxpayers, plus Abbott district and Department of Education bureaucrats.

But the Democrats only allowed the amendment to go to the voters after they had subtly gutted it.

Yes, the 2008 amendment reads as follows and would seemingly prohibit Contract Debt even for Abbott construction.

b. On and after the date on which this subparagraph b. becomes part of the Constitution, the Legislature shall not enact any law that, in any manner, creates or authorizes the creation of a debt or liability of an autonomous public corporate entity, established either as an instrumentality of the State or otherwise exercising public and essential governmental functions, which debt or liability has a pledge of an annual appropriation as the ways and means to pay the interest of such debt or liability as it falls due and pay and discharge the principal of such debt, unless a law authorizing the creation of that debt for some single object or work distinctly specified therein shall have been submitted to the people at a general election and approved by a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon. Voter approval shall not be required for any such law providing that the ways and means to pay the interest of and to pay and discharge the principal of such debt or liability shall be subject to appropriations of an independent non-State source of revenue paid by third persons for the use of the single object or work thereof, or from a source of State revenue otherwise required to be appropriated pursuant to another provision of this Constitution. [my emphasis]

Since the legislature's approval of this amendment was simultaneous with its approval of the $3.9 billion round of Abbott Contract Debt, and the NJ Supreme Court would reason that since the legislature passed Contract Debt for school construction at the same time it authorized an amendment prohibiting future Contract Debt, that the legislature's intent was to allow Abbott Contract Debt.

This means that the voters in 2008 had no choice but to constitutionalize Abbott Contract Debt: if the voters rejected the amendment, the Lonegan I NJ Supreme Court decision allowing Abbott Contract Debt would stand; if the voters passed the amendment Contract Debt would still be allowed since the amendment was passed at the same time that the legislature authorized other contract debt!

I remember voting for the debt constitutional amendment that year, but it never occurred to me that this amendment wouldn't actually disallow what was one of the biggest issuances of NJ debt.

The 2008 amendment was meaningless. The kind of borrowing for operating expenses that Jim McGreevey had done had already been disallowed by the Supreme Court anyway.
[update, this rationale is why Christie's $300 million bonding for statehouse renovations is legal.]

It's Our Fault

I've criticized the madness and despotism of the NJ Supreme Court repeatedly on this blog, but I have to admit, it's also our fault.

NJ's voters have had many chances to reform Abbott in the last quarter century but we haven't seriously tried to and we've elected politicians who support Abbott.  Steve Lonegan himself has ran for governor, but not even gotten the Republican nomination.

In my opinion, the acceptance of fiscally disastrous policies like Abbott isn't because we support Abbott, but because the true costs of Abbott have been obscured from us.  In the 1990s NJ dramatically cut pension contributions, diverted the pension money into education aid and other spending, and enjoyed a period of moderate taxes despite huge increases in spending.  Highly-informed voters didn't like the borrowing, but there was no urgency to fix anything among most people.

Our politicians and judges deserve a lot of blame for NJ's fiscal calamity, but ultimately, it's our fault. Representative democracy depends on voters understanding the issues and understanding where politicians stand on them.  It's easy to do a Leonard Lance and blame "Trenton politicians" for our mess, but we are the ones who elected and reelected them.

People don't get the laws they want, but they get the democracy they deserve.

---
Update, this is a history of NJ's school construction debt servicing.  A major reason that K-12 opex aid was flat-funded in the Christie years and municipal aid has been flat-funded continuing into the Murphy years.



---

More Abbott History:

Sources for Star-Ledger Quotes

(1) "Bottom line on schools may double - Hearing told the tab could hit $11.5 billion"

(2) "Help for poor schools draws fire - Assembly Republicans want to limit spending ordered by Supreme Court"

(3) "New Jersey voters to decide on two statewide ballot questions"






Wednesday, July 20, 2016

The Transformation of State Aid Since 1990


This post is about the transformation of the state aid distribution in New Jersey from the 1989-90 school year up to the present and how the Abbott II decision of 1990 has upended the state's relationship with middle-class school districts.

This is a lengthy post, so I will begin with a few bullet points.

  1. Prior to the Abbott II decision, NJ already had a progressive aid distribution where poor districts got more aid.
  2. Among poor districts, NJ already had a bias in favor of poor urban districts (the future Abbotts) over poor rural and poor suburban districts.
  3. NJ's aid increase has doubled the rate of inflation even though student population growth since 1989-90 has only been about one-third.
  4. From 1990 to 2002 NJ's pension contributions fell from $750 million to $0.  During that time state aid increased by $3 billion, from $2.5 billion to $5.5 billion. 
  5. In per student and inflation-adjusted terms, most New Jersey districts get less aid than they did before Abbott. 
  6. The districts who have lost the most state aid per student are not wealthy districts who could easily fund education with local money; the biggest "losers" are districts who have gained the most population.

Chris Christie was wrong to propose that every district get equal state aid per student, but he is 100% correct that the Abbott System is a major cause of New Jersey's property tax crisis.  ("Major" does not mean "sole").

The Education Law Center says that any attempt to link Abbott to New Jersey's property tax crisis is "scapegoating" the Abbotts, but this is just the Education Law Center insulting the intelligence of the state.

The word "scapegoat," as a verb, means to cast blame onto something that is blameless. People may believe that Abbott funding still has educational merit, but to deny that Abbott funding is a major cause of high property taxes is preposterous because the enormous money given to the Abbotts has been diverted from middle-class, working class, and poor non-Abbotts.

The early 1990s state aid data in this post have not been available online previously.  I got the state aid and enrollment data from the Department of Education via an OPRA request.  I've put everything online here.  See the conclusion of this post for more information about the data.

State Aid in 1989-1990

In 1990, when the landmark Abbott II decision came out, New Jersey's K-12 state aid total was $2,536,074,465, divided amongst 1,076,005 students, so $2,356 per student.

This amount would be $4,330 per student adjusted for inflation.

In terms of a per student average, K-12 state aid in 1989-90 was thus significantly less than it is today.  For 2016-17, $8,031,337,334 in K-12 aid is divided amongst 1.3 million K-12 students, or $6,177 per student.
 
The increase in state aid from 1989-90 to today has vastly exceeded inflation and student population growth.



As you can see, as New Jersey increased state aid in the 1990s we first diminished and then completely eliminated pension contributions.  Thus, in discussing the origins of the Pension Crisis, the surge in state aid must be cited in addition to the sales tax cut of 1992 and Whitman's income tax cut of 1994.

Although the Education Law Center implicitly demands that New Jersey continue the pace state aid increases that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s, the pace of increase was not sustainable.

A Flatter Distribution, but Still Progressive

Aside from being a significantly lower "aid effort," state aid before the Abbott II decision had a flatter distribution than today, meaning poor towns got less and middle-class towns got more.

Yet, contrary to what is sometimes said, the pre-Abbott distribution was clearly progressive and there was already a bias in favor of "urban" districts due to the Kean Administration's attempt to give more aid to districts on the Department of Community Affairs' list of "urban municipalities."

For instance, even before the Abbott II decision came out, Newark got $263.8 million, which was more than all of Bergen County and all of non-Newark Essex combined.  Most future Abbotts got significantly less than Newark did, but they got more money than towns you might call working class and more than non-urban DFG A and B districts.

For example, in 1989-90, Millburn got $476 per student ($875 per student with inflation).  Newark got $5,519 per student ($10,155 per student with inflation), so the ratio of Millburn:Newark state aid was 1:11.  Today Millburn gets $416 per student and Newark gets $14,647, so a ratio of 1:35.

A reasonable person might consider the 1989-90 distribution to be unfair since affluent districts had vastly superior tax bases and could more than compensate for inferior state aid, but the state was still trying to give more to poor districts.



The same pattern exists for Mercer County, where state aid was progressive but flatter than it is now.



What I have never seen discussed before is that there was already a bias in favor of districts the state considered urban.


Amounts are adjusted for inflation.
The Abbotts and Everyone Else

The future Abbott districts got $1,024,840,106 in 1989-90, or 40% of the total.  At the time the Abbotts had about 24% of NJ's students.

In crafting the Abbott decisions, the NJ Supreme Court disregarded analternative aid approach to raise spending in the Abbotts up to a threshold considered "adequate."  Instead, the NJ Supreme Court said that whatever the level of the spending in the DFG I and J districts was, the Abbotts had to be at or above that level.

Since Abbott aid was tied to spending in the DFG I and J districts, the state tried to restrain spending in DFGs I and J.  Jim Florio's original Quality Education Aid of 1990 "shot the suburbs in the kneecaps" by making them pay for pensions, post-retirement health care, and deeply slashed their aid, but suburban pension assumption was reversed and the aid cuts did not (initially) go as deep as what Florio had planned.

Although DFG I and J districts gained virtually no aid, since they were not restrained from spending their own tax dollars, they were still able to increase their budgets and Abbott aid increased more than Jim Florio had wanted.

Thus, Abbott spending more than quadrupled.

First Abbott Aid doubled from $1,024,840,106 in 1989-90 to $2,291,696,951 in 1997-1998, when the Abbotts reached parity with DFG I and J districts.  During those eight years, inflation had only been 29%.

Over the next two decades to 2016-17, Abbott funding would again more than double again, to $5.1 billion (counting Pre-K).  Whereas in 1989-90, the Abbotts got 40% of the state aid total, in the 2010s they get 60% of a much larger total.

The Abbotts got the lion's share of the increase, but poor non-Abbotts did reasonably well during the 1990s.  However, after 2001-02, non-Abbott aid began a multiyear stagnation.



Aid by '90 DFG 1989-90 Aid 2016-17 Aid (counts Pre-K) Percentage Increase
Abbott $1,024,840,106 $5,097,138,421 397.36%
DFG A Non-Abbott $33,026,612 $90,616,671 174.37%
DFG B Non-Abbot $193,413,331 $651,367,836 236.78%
DFG CD $206,432,630 $588,105,998 184.89%
DFG DE $305,697,001 $793,285,540 159.50%
DFG FG $220,873,914 $488,171,679 121.02%
INFLATION 94%
DFG GH $232,498,986 $431,780,101 85.71%
DFG I $196,401,926 $273,268,931 39.14%
DFG J $9,054,787 $12,979,326 43.34%

It's critical to remember that these totals conceal great variation.  Even though DFGs A through FG appear to have gained, there are districts who have lost aid in each of those DFGs, even DFGs A and B. Lawrence Township in Cumberland County was DFG A, but it has lost aid in per pupil and inflation adjusted terms.  Lakewood was in DFG B, but it has also lost aid.

In per pupil terms and inflation-adjusted terms, a majority of NJ districts have lost aid.

Of the state's $5.54 billion increase in K-12 opex aid, the Abbotts have gotten over $4 billion, or nearly two-thirds. Counting construction aid and Pre-K aid, the Abbott increase easily exceeds two-thirds.




The Biggest Losers

I hate to use the word "loser" in the context of any district, but I can't think of another antonym for "gainer" that fits.

The biggest losers in aid per student are NOT wealthy districts like Millburn, Princeton, and Mountain Lakes.  The largest losers in state aid are districts for whom aid has been flat or negative and population growth has been dramatic.

Chesterfield is NJ's biggest loser, since its population has quintupled and its aid has actually dropped. In 1989-90, Chesterfield got $523,570 for 228 students.  For 2016-17, Chesterfield will get $419,983 for 801 students.  

 Adjusted for inflation, Chesterfield has lost 87% of its state aid ($4,225 per student in '89-90, $501 per student for '16-'17)

It's possible that Chesterfield was overaided in 1989-90, but a drop of this magnitude is unacceptable unless there has been a tremendous increase in wealth.

There are in fact about 100 districts in New Jersey that have lost aid in nominal terms and these districts are not all wealthy. Cherry Hill, is the state's biggest loser in nominal dollars. It got $18,222,828 in 1989-90. Now it gets $13,110,005.



Conclusion:

The trend of state aid increases outpacing inflation was never going to be sustainable and New Jersey has to get used to a "new normal" where state aid increases are modest and often lag inflation and student population growth.

The huge surge for the Abbotts is particularly unsustainable.  Given the ineffectiveness of Abbott spending, Abbott aid should be be redistributed to other needy districts.

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Data Note:

The state aid amounts I got from the DOE were in a very easy to use Excel format, but the enrollment data had to be scanned in manually. Since the enrollment data is formatted in a way that is not machine-readable, I have had to hand copy the data myself. Please excuse any data entry errors and try to focus on the big picture.

Also, the state has changed how it calculates enrollment for districts that have sending-receiving relationships with high schools.  The 1989-90 enrollment numbers I got did not include send-receive kids for whom the district pays tuition, although these students counted towards state aid.  The 2016-17 enrollment figures I have do include send-receive kids.  Because the 1989-90 and 2016-17 enrollment figures for send-receive districts are calculated differently I exclude them from 1989-90/2015-16 per pupil comparisons.